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Abstract I conduct an empirical analysis of the relation between retirement and outpatient
care use in Europe and the US, and investigate the potential driving factors of that. I link
the empirical analysis to a theoretical model of medical care demand. I document that pen-
sioners tend to visit a doctor with higher probability and more often than the rest of the 50+
population. Ceteris paribus, being retired implies 3–10% more outpatient visits in Europe.
The estimates are of similar magnitude in the US. The paper contributes to the understanding
of how population ageing plays a part in the rising health care expenditures. I find evidence
that retirement related individual characteristics, increasing leisure time and stronger health
preferences all contribute to the positive relation between retirement and outpatient care use,
which is mainly driven by the healthier individuals. The gatekeeper role of general practi-
tioners can mitigate the increased demand for outpatient care services after retirement.
Keywords Health care demand · Outpatient care · Retirement · Gatekeeping
JEL Classification I10 · I12 · J14
Introduction
Expenditures on outpatient care make up around 33% of total health expenditures in the
OECD. Spending on outpatient care is increasing, between 2009 and 2013 its real annual
growth rate was 1.7%, only the long-term care expenditures had a higher growth rate (OECD
2015). This paper has two aims. First, to analyse and provide explanations to the relations
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between retirement and outpatient care use, both theoretically and empirically. Second, to
investigate some of the cross country differences in the relation between retirement and
outpatient care use. This analysis can help us better understand the determinants of the
demand for outpatient care, which issue is relevant for policies aiming at reducing public
health expenditures while improving population health.
Based on data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), pensioners are more likely to use outpatient care
than the rest of the population of comparable age. This can be observed both in Europe and
the US, and even if age is controlled for. Also, within Europe, pensioners on average visit
a specialist more frequently than those who are working. I analyse how age, socioeconomic
conditions, health, health preferences and time constraints can contribute to the explanation
of the retirement—outpatient care use gradient. The baseline results are based on pooled non-
linear regression models, which are then extended with interaction terms between retirement
status and indicators of health, time constraints and health preferences. I also analyse the
relation between retirement and outpatient care use by countries and by country groups
according to institutional characteristics. Endogeneity issues are addressedwith using official
retirement ages and observed population level retirement rates as instruments. The empirical
analysis corresponds to the theoretical framework of utility maximisation.
Bonsang et al. (2012), Coe and Zamarro (2011), and Neuman (2008), among others, use
either of the same data sets to analyse the health effects of retirement (finding positive effect
on physical health and negative effect on cognitive functioning), without focusing on the
relationship between retirement and outpatient care use. Although there is a rich literature
on the health effects of retirement (e.g. two recent studies from Europe are Eibich (2015)
and Hallberg et al. (2015), finding positive health effects and decreased health care use if
health is not controlled for), my paper differs from that literature in focusing on the effects
of retirement on outpatient care use, conditional on observed health.
This paper is related to two strands of the literature: a more general strand that explains the
demand for medical care, and a more specific strand that documents the utilisation of health
care in relation to retirement. The utility maximisation framework that I apply fits into the
line of literature originating from the seminal work of Grossman (1972) who derives a basic
model of optimal stock of health capital and hence of investment in health. Acton (1975)
focuses on how nonmonetary factors affect the demand for medical care. In my paper the
focus is also mainly on nonmonetary determinants of outpatient care use. Other papers such
as Cameron et al. (1988) analyse both theoretically and empirically the demand for health
care, without focusing on the effect of retirement.
There is a lack of recent literature that would investigate and explain the relationship
between health care use and retirement. Some earlier papers findmixed results on this relation
mainly based on US data. There is even less evidence on the relation within Europe. Also,
the existing papers are mostly of descriptive nature. The results of Soghikian et al. (1991),
based on data from Northern California, do not support a positive relationship between
leisure time and health care use by retirees. Similarly, based on Canadian data, Shapiro and
Roos (1982) find that retirement does not necessarily imply higher utilization of ambulatory
care. On the other hand, based on US data, Boaz and Muller (1989) find that retirees are
significantly more likely to use outpatient care services than the self-employed, and their
expected number of doctoral visits is also higher. However, they do not find such significant
differences between the employees and pensioners. I find more robust albeit relatively small
differences between the pensioners and the rest of the 50+ population in terms of outpatient
care use. The differences compared to the earlier literature can stem from several factors:
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later time periods are covered, different data sets are used, covering different countries, and
there are differences in the empirical strategy as well.
Overall, I find evidence for a positive relation between retirement and outpatient care
use, both in Europe and the US. These results are conditional on health and other individual
characteristics, thus do not contradict the results in the literature on the health improving
effects of retirement but suggest that ceteris paribus, the demand for outpatient care increases
after retirement. Focusing on the European data, further specification checks reveal that
the positive relations are driven by the healthier individuals, those who were more time
constrained while working, and those for whom health seems to matter more. Cross country
comparisons do not indicate that the retirement—outpatient care use gradient would clearly
be related to outpatient care co-payments. However, the results suggest that the gatekeeping
role of GPs can reduce the retirement induced demand for outpatient care.
Model
In this section I present a simple model of health care use that can serve as a framework
for the empirical analysis and discussion. My aim is to present a model which has a closed
form solution, but can capture well the relationship between retirement and health care use.
The model’s solution is derived in the Appendix. The model follows Grossman (1972) in the
sense that medical care can increase the stock of health capital, which has a positive effect on
utility. For the sake of simplicity, it is a static health care demand model with Cobb-Douglas
utility of consumption (C) and health (H ) with parameter 0 < γ < 1, and where health
is a linear function of health care use (M). Health is also allowed to depend on retirement
status, with ρ being the binary indicator which equals one if someone is retired and zero if
working.1 In this simple specification, the effect of ageing on health is captured by the effect
of retirement on health. φ0 is the health level without health care use, which is at the same
time the lowest possible level of health (conditional on retirement status).
max
C≥0,M≥0U = C
γ H1−γ (1)
H = φ0 (ρ) + φ1M; φ0, φ1 ≥ 0. (2)
The budget constraint is:
C + pM = ρR + (1 − ρ)w (W0 + W1H − tM) , (3)
where the consumption goods have unit price, p is the price of medical care, R is pension
income, w is the hourly wage, W0 is the working hours if someone has health asset H = 0,
W1 is the increase in working hours due to an unit of improvement in health, and t is the time
cost of health care use. To keep the model as simple as possible, I assume that retirement
status, income, working hours conditional on health and hourly wages are all exogenous.
Although retirement status is likely to depend on health, my aim is not to model the retire-
ment decision but to analyse the health care use differences between the retired and working
individuals, therefore it is sufficient to capture the retirement-health relations with allowing
health to depend on retirement status and then solve the model for the retired and the work-
ing. I return to the issue of endogenous retirement in relation to the empirical strategy in
“Instrumental variables” section.
1 I assume here that someone is either working or retired.
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Solving themodel yields that for the retired (ρ = 1) the optimal demand formedical care is:
Mρ=1 = −γ φ0 (ρ = 1)
φ1
+ (1 − γ ) R
p
. (4)
For the working population (ρ = 0) the optimal demand is:
Mρ=0 = −γ φ0 (ρ = 0)
φ1
+ (1 − γ )w [W0 + W1φ0 (ρ = 0)]
p − w (W1φ1 − t) . (5)
Based on this model, there are multiple possible reasons why health care demand might
increase after retirement (Mρ=1 > Mρ=0). First, it can be the result of decreasing out-of-
pocket cost of medical care (p). Second, changing health preferences (decreasing γ ) can also
provide explanation. Decreasing time costs (t) can also play a role—in the above model I
assumed that the cost of time is zero after retirement. If the marginal health benefit of medical
care (φ1) increases after retirement and the health level without care (φ0) decreases then these
factors can also imply higher demand. In the empirical analysis I address these possibilities by
analysing how institutional characteristics, health, indicators of time constraints and health
preferences influence the estimated effect of retirement on outpatient care use.
On the other hand, there is another mechanism in the model that implies decreasing health
care demand after retirement. While working, income depends on health (through W1), thus
also on health care use. The positive effect of W1 on M is reflected in the second part of
Eq. 5. This financial incentive to be healthy disappears after retirement.2 This implication of
the model is in line with the model solutions of Case and Deaton (2005) and Mazzonna and
Peracchi (2012). To what extent this mechanism reduces the positive effect of retirement on
health care use is an empirical question. The results of “Main results” section suggest that
the positive effects dominate.
Data
The main source of data I use in the paper is the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE).3 As part of the extensions, I compare in “Evidence from the US” section
the results from Europe to the results based on the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)4
from the US. The SHARE is a multidisciplinary and cross-national panel database covering
individuals aged 50 and above and their spouses. The survey runs bi-annually, the first wave
2 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this additional mechanism.
3 This paper uses data from SHARE wave 4 release 1.1.1, as of March 28th 2013 (doi:10.6103/SHARE.w4.
111) and SHARE wave 1 and 2 release 2.6.0, as of November 29 2013 (doi:10.6103/SHARE.w1.260 and 10.
6103/SHARE.w2.260). The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission
through the 5th Framework Programme (project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic programme Quality
of Life), through the 6th Framework Programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE,
CIT5- CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and through the 7th Framework Pro-
gramme (SHARE-PREP, No. 211909, SHARE-LEAP, No. 227822 and SHAREM4, No. 261982). Additional
funding from the U.S. National Institute on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30
AG12815, R21 AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, IAG BSR06-11 and OGHA 04-064) and the German Ministry
of Education and Research as well as from various national sources is gratefully acknowledged (see http://
www.share-project.org for a full list of funding institutions).
4 I use the RAND HRS Data, Version N. This data set is produced by the RAND Center for the Study of
Aging. The HRS is sponsored by the National Institute on Aging (Grant No. NIA U01AG009740) and is
conducted by the University of Michigan. The RAND HRS Data file is an easy to use longitudinal data set
based on the HRS data. It was developed at RAND with funding from the National Institute on Aging and the
Social Security Administration.
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Table 1 Gatekeeping and copayments in the analysed countries
GP gatekeeper GP not gatekeeper
Co-payments
required
US, NL, SI, IT (specialist), DK
(specialist), EE (specialist), FR
(pensioners exempt), PT (social
security beneficiaries exempt)
AT, SE, CH, CZ, DE (with incentives
for gatekeeping), GR (pensioners
exempt), BE (with incentives for
gatekeeping; pre 2007: lower
co-payments for pensioners)
No co-payments ES, PL, IT(GP), DK(GP), EE(GP) HU
Source Albreht et al. (2009), Anell et al. (2012), Barros et al. (2011), Bryndová et al. (2009), Busse and
Blümel (2014), Chevreul et al. (2010), Economou (2010), European Observatory on Health Care Systems
(2000), Ferré et al. (2014), Gaál et al. (2011), García-Armesto et al. (2010), Gerkens and Merkur (2010),
Hofmarcher and Quentin (2013), Lai et al. (2013), Olejaz et al. (2012), Rice et al. (2013), Sagan et al. (2011),
and Schäfer et al. (2010)
of the data covers years 2004/2005. I use the first four waves of SHARE except for wave 3
data, which are retrospective (called SHARELIFE). I do not use data from wave 5 because
GP and specialist visits are not differentiated in the survey of that wave. Although this is
a panel database, there is variation in the country coverage across waves. I exclude Ireland
and Israel from the empirical analysis because the income variable I use is not available for
these two countries, Israel is an outlier in terms of the fieldwork times and of geographical
location, and Ireland participated only in wave 2 of the survey.
I analyse the usage of outpatient care services, measured with four indicators: whether the
respondent visited a GP or a specialist during the last twelve months, and the number of these
visits. Due to item non-response, the number of observations vary across these fourmeasures.
I focus on outpatient care because individual preferences and resources are likely to have a
stronger influence than on inpatient care use, which is mainly determined by health itself.
In most of the countries, GPs have some kind of gatekeeping role, i.e. a patient first
has to see her GP if she wishes to contact a specialist. Also, countries commonly require
some co-payments for some of the outpatient services. These institutional characteristics are
summarised in Table 1.
I present some descriptive statistics in Table 2. These statistics refer to the pooled sample.
The sample is restricted to those individuals for whom the individual characteristics used in
the analysis are non-missing (apart from health care use). This sample restriction facilitates
the comparison of the results across the various specifications. The observations are weighted
such a way that within each wave, each country has overall the same weight. Retirement is
defined based on the self reported current job situation.
Empirical results
Main results
Baseline results
Using the pooled SHARE data, I estimate binary outcome models with probit, and count
data models with negative binomial regression.5 In the following tables I present the average
5 The results are robust to restricting the sample to the first observation per each respondent, instead of using
the pooled data.
123
A. Bíró
Table 2 Descriptive statistics, weighted SHARE data (pooled)
Variable Mean SD Obs Variable Mean Obs
GP, binary 0.813 0.390 111,779 Employment
GP, count 4.443 7.080 111,779 Employee, not public 0.443 112,542
Specialist, binary 0.424 0.494 112,332 Employee, public 0.194 112,542
Specialist, count 1.853 5.105 106,106 Civil servant 0.107 112,542
Retired 0.538 0.499 112,456 Self-employed 0.136 112,542
Age 65.390 10.319 112,542 Other or not known 0.121 112,542
Female 0.559 0.496 112,542 Living area
Income (EUR) 14,014 18,175 112,542 Big city 0.146 112,542
Illness, count 1.627 1.504 112,542 Suburbs big city 0.135 112,542
ADL limitations, count 0.229 0.826 112,542 Large town 0.176 112,542
Symptoms, count 1.811 1.917 112,542 Small town 0.231 112,542
Current smoker 0.190 0.393 112,542 Rural 0.313 112,542
Marital status Subjective health
Married 0.707 112,542 Excellent (very good) 0.092 112,542
Registered partnership 0.017 112,542 Very good (good) 0.202 112,542
Married, separated 0.011 112,542 Good (fair) 0.351 112,542
Never married 0.052 112,542 Fair (bad) 0.250 112,542
Divorced 0.071 112,542 Poor (very bad) 0.104 112,542
Widowed 0.143 112,542
International standard classification of education (ISCED)
Pre-primary 0.035 112,542
Primary 0.233 112,542
Lower secondary 0.181 112,542
Secondary 0.320 112,542
Post-secondary, not
tertiary
0.038 112,542
1st stage of tertiary 0.189 112,542
2nd stage of tertiary 0.005 112,542
Income is the average of the imputed annual gross household income values provided in SHARE, ppp adjusted,
divided by household size. The indicators of illness (max 12), ADL limitations (max 6) and symptoms (max 13)
are based on lists of possible conditions. The employment indicator refers to the current job, if exists, otherwise
to the last job. For 14,000 observations the subjective health categories are very good/good/fair/bad/very bad
marginal effects of the variables of main interest. The standard errors are clustered on the
household level.
The first set of results are displayed in Table 3. In specification (1) I include wave and
country dummies only. The results show that on average, retirees use more outpatient care
than the rest of the 50+ population in Europe. Compared to the average number of visits,
retirees have on average 26% more GP visits and 13% more specialist visits per year. These
differences are statistically significant, and stronger for GP care than for specialist care. As
specification (2) reveals, the higher use of outpatient care is partly explained by the age
differences, as retirees are on average 15 years older than the rest of the population in the
estimation sample. Including additional individual level control variables (specification (3))
has little effect on the estimated differences by retirement, except for the effect on the number
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Fig. 1 Effect of retirement on health care use (controlling for individual characteristics and wave dummies),
local polynomial smooth with 95% confidence interval, SHARE data
of GP visits. Based on this specification, retirees are around 2% points more likely to visit an
outpatient physician, and the annual number of GP and specialist visits is on average 0.14–
0.18 higher. This implies a 3–10% higher number of visits than the average. Restricting
the estimation sample to nonzero outcomes reveals that the positive estimated effects on the
count outcomes as reported in Table 3, specification (3), are mainly driven by the increasing
effect of retirement on the likelihood of outpatient care use, rather than by a positive effect
on nonzero visits. If only the health controls are excluded from specification (3) then the
estimated effect of retirement on health care use is slightly higher,6 indicating that without
health controls the retirement effects would be overestimated.
To analyse the dynamics of how retirement influences outpatient care use, I plot the
residuals of health care use (controlling for wave dummies and the individual controls used
in specification (3), including health indicators, apart from retirement and age) as function of
age, by retirement status. The plots of Fig. 1 indicate that the increasing effect of retirement on
outpatient care use tends to appear at older ages. The marginal effect of retirement increases
with age for all four dependent variables, which is the clearest for the binary indicator of GP
visits. Since the typical age of retirement is around 65, the plots suggest that outpatient care
use among the retirees is higher even long time after retirement.
6 Excluding health controls, the estimated marginal effect of retirement on GP binary, specialist binary, GP
count, specialist count is 0.0280, 0.0268, 0.191, 0.194, respectively, all statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Instrumental variables
Although retirement status might still be endogenous in specification (3) due to unobserved
health problems linked both to retirement and health care use, the small difference between
the results of specifications (2) and (3) and the increasing estimated retirement effect on the
number of GP visits suggest that there are no such important endogeneity issues.
I apply two different instrumenting strategies to check the importance of endogene-
ity issues. First, I use data from MISSOC (2016) to generate gender and country specific
indicators of early and full statutory retirement age, referring to year 2004, 2006 or 2010
(corresponding to survey wave 1, 2 and 4, respectively). This instrumenting strategy is stan-
dard in the literature, as also applied by Coe and Zamarro (2011) andMazzonna and Peracchi
(2012), among others. The statutory retirement ages can be assumed exogenous determinants
of retirement, however, the instruments are subject to measurement error since in almost
all of the analysed countries the official retirement ages are not homogeneous but depend
among others on the years of service, service type, year of birth, or the number of children.
Based on these indicators I generate two binary instrumental variables of whether some-
one is aged above the early and full retirement ages. Measurement errors in these variables
weaken their strength as instruments and invalidate the zero conditional mean assumption of
the vector of error terms in the estimated bivariate probit models, implying that the models
are misspecified.7 Because of limitations of the MISSOC (2016) data, I follow a second
instrumenting strategy, as well. Based on the SHARE data, I generate age, gender and coun-
try specific ratios of retired individuals as instrument for being retired.8 The drawback of
this specification is that these ratios reflect individual retirement decisions, again imply-
ing endogeneity issues. I re-estimate specification (3) using these two alternative sets of
instruments.
First, I re-estimate the binary outcome (probit) models with bivariate probit models, treat-
ing retirement as an endogenous variable, and using either the indicators of being above the
statutory retirement age or the measure of retirement ratios as identifying variables for the
effect of retirement on health care use. These indicators are strong predictors of retirement
(Table 4).9 Identification of the bivariate probit model also comes from the functional form
(assumption of joint normality of the error terms).
The estimated average marginal effects on the binary indicators of health care use are
presented in the first part of Table 5. These suggest that if anything, the reported baseline
results underestimate the true effects of retirement, possibly due to the unobserved health-
preserving effect of retirement.
Second, I re-estimate the count data models using a generalised method of moments
estimator of Poisson regression (using the “ivpois” Stata command of Nichols (2007)). The
estimated marginal effects are reported in the second part of Table 5. These estimates are
based on unweighted data without clustering (due to the limitations of the “ivpois” method),
7 For a discussion of measurement errors in bivariate probit models, see Roy and Banerjee (2009).
8 In their working paper, Bonsang et al. (2010) use a similar instrumental variable for retirement in the SHARE
data.
9 Instead of the bivariate probit models, the method of two-stage least squares (2SLS) could also be applied,
although that does not take into account the binary nature of the outcome variables and the retirement indicator.
For discussion of the bivariate probit models, see Angrist and Pischke (2008) and Chiburis et al. (2012). The
2SLS estimates of the effect of retirement on the binary outcomes are slightly above the bivariate probit results.
First stage statistics indicate that the applied instruments are strong, as also suggested by the results of Table 4.
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Table 4 Average marginal
effects of the identifying
variables on retirement, bivariate
probit models, SHARE data
The individual controls are: age,
age squared, gender, marital
status, ISCED level, employment
category, log income, living area,
subjective health, and the number
of illness, ADL limitations and
symptoms
Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors in brackets,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗ p < 0.1
(1) (2)
Retired Retired
Above early ret age 0.101∗∗∗
(0.00435)
Above full ret age 0.129∗∗∗
(0.00427)
Mean retirement rate 0.573∗∗∗
(0.00532)
Individual controls Yes Yes
Wave dummies Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes
Observations 112,293 112,293
but the differences from the results reported in Table 3 are driven by the usage of the
instrument. These results indicate that if exogenous retirement is assumed, the estimated
effect of retirement on the number of GP visits might be slightly overestimated, whereas the
effect on the number of specialist visits is underestimated.10 The magnitude of the over- and
underestimation is relatively small.
The results suggest that treating the retirement indicator as exogenous lead to similar
conclusions as if applying instrumental variables. In the following analysis I treat retirement
as exogenous because of the difficulties related to instrumenting in the applied non-linear
models. Even if there were endogeneity issues, the next set of estimations in which I inves-
tigate the driving factors of the positive relations between retirement and outpatient care use
would remain valid as the results can reveal some underlying mechanisms of the correlations
between retirement and outpatient care use.
Heterogeneity of retirement effects
My aim under the next set of specifications (Table 6) is to reveal which subgroups of the
retired population drive the positive estimated effects on outpatient care use. This analysis also
allows me to check two implications of the model of “Model” section, namely that changing
time costs and health preferences can imply increasing health care use after retirement.
First, in specification (4) I include an interaction term between being retired and the number
of symptoms, as a representative indicator of health.11 The results indicate that retirement
implies more outpatient care use among those who are in good health, which difference
diminishes with the number of symptoms a respondent reports. Thus the relatively healthy
seem more likely to increase outpatient care use after retirement. An explanation for this
finding can be that individual suffering from severe health conditions visit the physicians
irrespective of their employment status. However, those who have only minor illnesses might
postpone such visits after retirementwhen they are less time constrained or paymore attention
to minor health problems.
10 2SLS estimated coefficient of retirement is even larger and statistically significant, except for the effect on
GP visits if mean retirement rate is used as instrument, in which case the retirement coefficient is insignificant.
11 The correlation coefficient of the number of symptoms with the number of illnesses is 0.59, with the
number of ADL limitation is 0.36, and with the subjective health measure is 0.52.
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In specification (5) I interact the retirement indicator with the type of employment at the
current or last job. Here I merge civil servant status with public employment. The biggest
effect of retirement on outpatient care use is found among those who were self-employed
at their last job. This holds for all four outcome variables, with the strongest difference
for the number of GP visits. An explanation can be that self-employed people are more
time-constrained than the rest of the working population. Based on the SHARE data, self-
employed work on average longer hours than the not self-employed, the difference in the
average is 2.5h per week. Retirement relaxes this time constraint, implying a higher effect on
health care use among the self-employed. This explanation is supported by the employment
category marginal effects (not presented), where self-employment has a negative marginal
effect on outpatient care use. Other possible explanations could be that the self-employed
are more likely to retire due to health reasons or their health insurance status changes with
retirement, however, these hypotheses are not supported by the data, using the reported reason
of retirement and reported changes in health insurance coverage.
Next, I analyse whether health preferences can help explain the higher use of outpatient
care among the retirees. I use smoking as a proxy for health preferences. The smoking indi-
cator equals one if a respondent reports smoking at the present time (19% of the respondents
in the estimation sample), zero otherwise. Specification (6) in Table 6 shows that on average,
smokers are less likely to visit an outpatient physician, and their average number of outpatient
visits is also smaller. However, controlling for smoking and its interaction with retirement
has little effect on the estimated effect of retirement among the non-smokers. Although the
results suggest that smoking implies a weaker effect of retirement (except for the effect on the
number of GP visits), this weakening effect is only weakly significant statistically. If smok-
ing captures health preferences then there is only weak evidence that the positive effect of
retirement on outpatient care use were driven by individuals who are more health conscious,
thus for whom health is more important.
There are at least two important problems with using smoking as a proxy for health
preferences in the current application. Smoking can be considered as an addictive habit,
therefore even if health preferences change after or around retirement, this might not be
reflected in the smoking habits. On the one hand, this restricts to what extent we can observe
changes in health preferences, on the other hand, this allows the results to be interpreted as
the effect of retirement by long-run health preferences (as captured by smoking). Also, there
is an endogeneity issue as more frequent physician visits might decrease the likelihood of
smoking if the physician informs the patient on the adverse effects of smoking.
Comparing the empirical findings to the theoretical model of “Model” section indicates
that the increasing effect of retirement on outpatient care use outweighs the potential decreas-
ing effect due to the lower market incentives for maintaining good health. The empirical
results are in line with being less time constrained andmore health conscious after retirement.
Cross country comparisons
Country by country analysis
In the previous section I estimated the effect of retirement on outpatient care use based on the
pooled sample of SHARE. Country by country analysis can reveal if institutional differences
as summarised in Table 1 have strong influence on the analysed relation. To some extent, I
can also address the effect of prices on the relations between retirement and outpatient care
use. The scope for country by country analysis is limited by the small country specific sizes
of the sample.
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The estimated country specific marginal effects of retirement are presented in Table 7. For
all countries and for all four dependent variables a significantly positive or insignificant (but
generally still positive) effect is estimated, except for the puzzling negative marginal effect
of being retired on the number of specialist care visits in Poland and the probability of GP
visits in Estonia. Another finding is that the estimated effects tend to be larger in the Southern
countries, namely Greece, Italy and Spain. Although indicators of health are controlled for,
this cross country differencemight still partly reflect that in the Southern countries individuals
select more into retirement based on health care needs. The estimated effects are generally
less precise for countries with fewer total number of observations, in particular for countries
for which only one wave of data are available (Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia, Estonia).
Institutional differences
The cross country coverage of the SHARE data allows me to analyse to what extent the
effect of retirement on outpatient care use differs according to the institutional differences
across the countries. In all the specifications of this subsection I re-estimate specification (3)
of Table 3 with the only difference that the estimation samples are selected based on certain
country-specific institutional characteristics. In this way I allow the effect of all the regressors
to differ between the country groups. The results are summarised in Table 8.
First, I analyse the heterogeneity with respect to the gatekeeper role of GPs. The results
indicate that the gatekeeping role of GPs decreases the estimated effect of retirement not only
on specialist care use but also on GP care use.
Next, I investigate if co-payments have an influence on the effect of retirement on out-
patient care use. The results suggest that the positive effect of retirement on the expected
number of GP visits is smaller in countries where co-payments are required for GP care
visits. There is no evidence that the retirement effect on specialist care would diminish with
the existence of co-payment requirements.
Finally, I check if the estimated effect of retirement on outpatient care use is bigger
in countries where pensioners are exempt from co-payments or have to pay reduced fees.
According to Table 1, this applies to Belgium, France, Greece and Portugal. I do not find
evidence for such differences. This simple analysis suggests that price changes (decreasing
p in the model of “Model” section) cannot explain the observed increase in outpatient care
use after retirement.
Evidence from the US
How is retirement related to outpatient physician visits in the US, in comparison to Europe?
The effect of retirement on outpatient care use in the US is analysed based on data from the
HRS. This data set served as a sample for the SHARE data, thus the structure and the topics
covered are similar. I use data from the first 11 waves of the HRS, covering years 1992–2012.
In the HRS there is no separate information on the usage of GP and specialist care facilities. I
estimate models of the binary indicator of outpatient physician visit and of the count of these
visits. There are some differences across waves how the outpatient care use is measured. The
reference year is the last year in wave 1, whereas the last two years in the other waves. In
all waves the respondents are instructed not to include hospital stays in the reported number
of doctoral visits, but in waves 1 and 2 they are also instructed not to include nursing home
stays. Because of the different length of the reference period I omit wave 1 observations
from the estimations. The other discrepancies across waves are handled by including wave
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Table 7 Estimated average marginal effect of retirement in country specific models of outpatient care use
GP, binary Specialist, binary GP, count Specialist, count
Austria 0.0144 0.0369∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 0.140
(0.0118) (0.0153) (0.171) (0.143)
Germany 0.0117 0.0309∗ 0.345 0.0531
(0.0123) (0.0175) (0.210) (0.199)
Sweden 0.0459∗∗∗ 0.00157 0.134 0.319∗∗∗
(0.0170) (0.0177) (0.0999) (0.0969)
Netherlands 0.0308∗∗ 0.0325∗∗ −0.0229 0.398∗∗∗
(0.0133) (0.0143) (0.0918) (0.154)
Spain 0.0308∗∗∗ 0.0438∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0150) (0.280) (0.155)
Italy 0.0263∗∗ 0.0498∗∗∗ 0.291 0.181
(0.0107) (0.0140) (0.287) (0.142)
France 0.00893 0.0173 0.112 0.115
(0.00799) (0.0135) (0.129) (0.122)
Denmark −0.0193 −0.0244 0.113 −0.237
(0.0165) (0.0179) (0.167) (0.174)
Greece 0.0126 0.0580∗∗∗ 0.304 0.499∗∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0180) (0.207) (0.175)
Switzerland 0.0458∗∗∗ 0.00998 0.146 0.251
(0.0162) (0.0186) (0.152) (0.189)
Belgium 0.0271∗∗∗ 0.0220∗ 0.185 0.0361
(0.00824) (0.0126) (0.164) (0.117)
Czech Rep. 0.0105 0.0327∗ 0.444∗∗ 0.115
(0.0121) (0.0175) (0.201) (0.247)
Poland 0.0397∗∗∗∗ −0.0337 0.280 −0.677∗∗∗
(0.0182) (0.0211) (0.293) (0.230)
Hungary 0.0311 0.0487∗ 0.283 0.394
(0.0198) (0.0260) (0.377) (0.314)
Portugal 0.0146 −0.0402 −0.646 −0.260
(0.0255) (0.0304) (0.457) (0.310)
Slovenia 0.0242 −0.00942 0.0780 0.173
(0.0265) (0.0259) (0.362) (0.202)
Estonia −0.0307∗∗ −0.0126 −0.234 0.106
(0.0153) (0.0163) (0.243) (0.155)
The included control variables are: wave dummies, age, age squared, gender, marital status, ISCED level,
employment category, log income, living area, subjective health, and the number of illness, ADL limitations
and symptoms
Clustered standard errors in brackets, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p< 0.1
dummies in all specifications. The binary variable “retired” equals one only for the full time
retired individuals.
Specification (1) is similar to the third specification of Table 3. I estimate probit and
negative binomial models of the two outcome indicators, including individual characteristics
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Table 8 Effect of retirement on outpatient care use by institutional characteristics, SHARE data
GP, binary Specialist, binary GP, count Specialist, count
Gatekeeping No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Retired 0.0256∗∗∗ 0.0189∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ −0.0283 0.290∗∗∗ 0.0862
(0.00502) (0.00474) (0.00635) (0.00589) (0.0805) (0.0964) (0.0769) (0.0657)
Observations 55,712 56,030 56,002 56,291 55,712 56,030 52,108 53,961
GP co-payments No Yes No Yes
Retired 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0238∗∗∗ 0.210∗ 0.136∗
(0.00589) (0.00426) (0.113) (0.0752)
Observations 35,673 76,069 35,673 76,069
Specialist
co-payments
No Yes No Yes
Retired 0.0234∗∗ 0.0219∗∗∗ 0.142 0.195∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.00468) (0.117) (0.0561)
Observations 14,430 97,863 13,853 92,216
Co-payments
decrease with
retirement
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Retired 0.0227∗∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ −0.0763 0.210∗∗∗ 0.101
(0.00407) (0.00608) (0.00501) (0.00822) (0.0662) (0.151) (0.0608) (0.0903)
Observations 81,348 30,394 81,770 30,523 81,348 30,394 77,223 28,846
The included control variables are: wave dummies, age, age squared, gender, marital status, ISCED level,
employment category, log income, living area, subjective health, and the number of illness, ADL limitations
and symptoms
Clustered standard errors in brackets, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
and wave dummies as regressors. Specification (2) is a first differenced (FD) model (which
gives similar results to a fixed effects specification).
A robust finding is that retirement implies higher number of outpatient doctoral visits
in the US, ceteris paribus. This finding is in contrast to the results of the earlier literature,
as discussed in “Introduction” section. The estimated effect is somewhat larger than based
on the European sample, however, here the effects refer to 2-year utilisation. The estimated
effects on the number of visits are qualitatively robust to the estimation method, although
quantitatively the effects decrease with first differencing. With a mean number of visits of
around 10, the estimated effects are moderate, comparable in relative terms to the European
estimates. There is no clear evidence that retirement would imply a higher probability of
outpatient doctoral visits. Since the average likelihood of reporting an outpatient visit is
above 90%, the small estimated effects are not surprising.
To check whether unobserved health or other effects drive the estimation results, I apply a
similar method as in “Instrumental variables” section for the SHARE data. I re-estimate the
probit and count data models and the first differencedmodels with using the binary indicators
of being aged above 62 and 65 as instrument for retirement.12 Similar instrumenting strategy
is applied by Bonsang et al. (2012), among others, and the rationale behind is that the early
12 As in “Instrumental variables” section, I estimate a bivariate probit model and a generalised method
of moments (GMM) estimator of Poisson regression. When instrumenting the first differenced retirement, I
estimate two stage least squares models.
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Table 9 Estimated average marginal effect (1) and coefficients (2) of retirement on outpatient doctoral visits
based on the HRS data
(1) (2)
Doctoral visits, binary Doctoral visits, count FD binary FD count
Retired 0.00459∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ −0.00219 0.533∗
(0.00205) (0.133) (0.00306) (0.307)
Age 0.00198∗∗ −0.0903
(0.000899) (0.0654)
Age squared −1.38e−05∗∗ 0.000393 1.33e−05 0.00496∗∗∗
(6.85e−06) (0.000489) (1.26e−05) (0.000971)
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 129,429 126,246 105,030 100,455
Individual controls in specification (1): gender, race, 5-level education, marital status, industry of job with
longest tenure, Census Division of residence, indicators of health insurance status, self reported health, number
of ever diagnosed health conditions (0 to 6) and ADL limitations. Individual controls in specification (2):
widowhood, indicators of health insurance status, self reported health, number of health conditions ever
diagnosed and ADL limitations
Clustered standard errors in brackets ((2): robust), ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Table 10 Estimated effect of retirement on outpatient doctoral visits using instrumental variables based on
the HRS data
Bivariate probit GMM 2SLS, FD binary 2SLS, FD count
Retired 0.00376 0.183 0.00718 −0.310
(0.0248) (0.119) (0.0330) (2.248)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 129,429 126,246 105,030 100,455
First stage F-stat 274.932∗∗∗ 267.975∗∗∗
Individual controls in the pooled models: gender, race, 5-level education, marital status, industry of job with
longest tenure, Census Division of residence, indicators of health insurance status, self reported health, number
of ever diagnosed health conditions (0–6) and ADL limitations
Individual controls in the FD models: widowhood, indicators of health insurance status, self reported health,
number of health conditions ever diagnosed and ADL limitations
Clustered standard errors in brackets, ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
(62) and full (65) retirement ages act as exogenous predictors of retirement. The results
are reported in Table 10. Looking at the pooled estimates with instrumental variables, the
results indicate that the magnitude of the effects of retirement on the probability and number
of doctoral visits might be overestimated, although the positive effects are robust results.
However, if the instruments are used in the first differenced models then the standard errors
become relatively large, hence the point estimates are unreliable. A further limitation of this
instrumenting strategy is that being aged above 65 also impliesMedicare eligibility, implying
direct effect of the instrument on health care use (as also pointed out by Eibich 2015).
Specification (2) of Table 9 indicates that retirement increases the number of outpatient
visits in the short run (within two years). If the first lag of transition to retirement is included
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Fig. 2 Effect of retirement on health care use (controlling for individual characteristics and wave dummies),
local polynomial smooth with 95% confidence interval, HRS data
as a regressor instead of the current one then a significant negative effect is estimated. The
positive short run effect is contrary to the SHARE results which indicate stronger long run
effects of retirement on outpatient care use. This difference is also reflected in the plots
of Fig. 2. The European data suggest increasing effect of retirement with age, whereas the
US data suggest a decreasing effect both on the probability of outpatient care use and on
the number of doctoral visits. An explanation for the short run effect in the US could be
that insurance status changes with retirement, gaining coverage for doctoral visits. However,
insurance coverage is controlled for, and changes in insurance status with retirement aremore
common at age 65 and above when Medicare Part B eligibility kicks in, while the figures
indicate positive effects of retirement on outpatient care use at earlier ages. Unobserved insur-
ance conditions can still contribute to the results. As the results with instrumental variables
also suggest, unobserved health might also drive part of the estimated retirement effects, in
particular at younger ages. The small or even negative long run effects of retirement in the
US might also be due to the fact that most people still have to pay co-payments for doctoral
visits, typically 20% (which is the rate of co-payments under Medicare Part B). Also, in the
US, there is less scope for retirement to increase the probability of having a doctoral visit
at older ages. Based on the surveys used, 93% of the not retired respondents aged 65 and
above report a doctoral visits, while the corresponding statistic for GP visits in Europe is
83% (and 43% for specialist visits). Thus, even without being retired, almost all respondents
report a doctoral visit at older ages in the US, therefore retirement cannot have a substantial
effect.
Conclusions
Retirees use more outpatient services than the rest of the population of similar age, both in
Europe and in the US. The utility maximisation model of health care demand derived in this
paper suggests that there can be multiple channels which contribute to this positive gradient.
Declining health after retirement, changing health preferences, decreasing opportunity cost
of time and institutional settings can all lead to the observed positive relation. The empirical
analysis sheds light on whether these possible mechanisms indeed play a role. Such an in-
depth analysis of the relation of retirement to outpatient care use is a novelty in the literature,
as well as the analysis of the relation based on European data. The empirical analysis is based
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on the European SHARE data, and the results are compared to US results based on data from
the HRS.
The results suggest that within Europe, a major part of the retirement—outpatient care
gradient is explained by age, health status, and other individual characteristics. Controlling
for these factors, the average number of GP and specialist visits per year is only 0.15–0.19
(3–10%) higher among the retirees than among the rest of the 50+ sample. A very rough
calculation (assuming 50$ cost of an outpatient visit in line with estimates of WHO (2016)
and 3,300$ per capita health expenditures, which is close to the OECD average) indicates that
it implies around 0.25% increase in per capita health expenditures due to retirement. These
results are qualitatively robust to using official retirement ages or population level retirement
statistics as instruments for retirement. While these estimates suggest only a small financial
burden of the additional outpatient care use due to retirement, in some European countries
the effects are much larger, reaching around 1% of the per capita spending on outpatient care.
Further estimations reveal that the positive relations are mostly driven by the healthier indi-
viduals, by the ones who could be considered as more time-constrained while working, and
by those who have stronger health preferences. Country-by-country analysis also reveals that
the gatekeeping role of GPs decreases the effect of retirement on specialist care use and co-
payments decrease the effect of retirement on GP visits. According to the estimation results,
a major difference in the gradient between Europe and US is that while in the US the positive
effect of retirement on outpatient care use can be observed right after retiring, there is no such
evidence for a short-run effect in Europe. Also, unlike in Europe, no evidence is found for pos-
itive long-run effects of retirement on outpatient care use in the US. The insurance coverage
structure and required co-payments in the US can provide explanation for these differences,
however, data limitations have to be kept in mind when drawing further conclusions from this
comparison.
An important policy relevant question is whether the higher use of outpatient care by the
retirees is welfare improving, or it rather creates an unintended burden on the health care
budget. The results of this paper can only provide some indicative answers to this question.
Part of the retirement—outpatient care gradient can be accounted for by other observable
characteristics, such as age and health. With ageing the need for health care increases, which
coincides with retirement. This part of the increased demand can be considered as justi-
fied. Also, a part of the increased utilisation can in fact be due to better access to care.
Before retirement, the access might be limited by time constraints (e.g. self-employed in
Europe) or by money constraints (e.g. in the US or in countries with substantial co-payments
in Europe). The removal of these constraints with retirement can in the end lead to health
improvements and more equal access to outpatient care. Health improvements are espe-
cially likely if the increased health care use implies extended use of preventive services.
Thus the positive estimated effect of retirement on outpatient care use does not necessar-
ily contradict the findings of the literature on the positive health effects of retirement. At
the same time, there seems to be a part of the health care use—retirement gradient which
can be due to excess demand occurring after retirement. This is reflected by the estimated
mitigating role of gatekeeping, and by the stronger retirement effect among the healthy
individuals. Ideally, once health is controlled for, there should be no retirement effect on
health care use. Any estimated effect is either due to time or money constraints before retire-
ment, together with the lack of attention paid to one’s own health, or to excess demand after
retirement.
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Appendix
I present here the detailed solution of the model of “Model” section. The maximisation
problem with consumption (C), health (H ), and health care use (M) is:
max
C≥0,M≥0U = C
γ H1−γ (6)
H = φ0 (ρ) + φ1M; φ0, φ1 ≥ 0. (7)
The budget constraint is:
C + pM = ρR + (1 − ρ)w (W0 + W1H − tM) . (8)
The parameters are defined in “Model” section. The maximisation problem can be rewritten
as:
max
M≥0U = (ρR + (1 − ρ)w [W0 + W1 (φ0 (ρ) + φ1M) − tM] − pM)
γ
× (φ0 (ρ) + φ1M)1−γ . (9)
The first order condition is:
γ [(1 − ρ)w (W1φ1 − t) − p]
×
(
φ0 (ρ) + φ1M
ρR + (1 − ρ)w [W0 + W1φ0 (ρ) + (W1φ1 − t) M] − pM
)1−γ
+ (1 − γ ) φ1
×
(
ρR + (1 − ρ)w [W0 + W1φ0 (ρ) + (W1φ1 − t) M] − pM
φ0 (ρ) + φ1M
)γ
= 0 (10)
This can be simplified to:
γ [(1 − ρ)w (W1φ1 − t) − p] + (1 − γ ) φ1
×ρR + (1 − ρ)w [W0 + W1φ0 (ρ) + (W1φ1 − t) M] − pM
φ0 (ρ) + φ1M = 0 (11)
After some rearrangements:
γ [(1 − ρ)w (W1φ1 − t) − p] (φ0 (ρ) + φ1M)
= (γ − 1) φ1 (ρR + (1 − ρ)w [W0 + W1φ0 (ρ) + (W1φ1 − t) M] − pM) ,
M = −γ [(1 − ρ)w (W1φ1 − t) − p]φ0 (ρ) + (1 − γ ) φ1 (ρR + (1 − ρ)w [W0 + W1φ0 (ρ)])
(1 − γ ) φ1 ((1 − ρ)w (W1φ1 − t) − p) + γφ1 [(1 − ρ)w (W1φ1 − t) − p]
= −γ φ0 (ρ)
φ1
− (1 − γ ) (ρR + (1 − ρ)w [W0 + W1φ0 (ρ)])
(1 − ρ)w (W1φ1 − t) − p . (12)
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For the retired (ρ = 1) the optimal demand for medical care therefore is:
Mρ=1 = −γ φ0 (ρ = 1)
φ1
+ (1 − γ ) R
p
. (13)
For the working population (ρ = 0) the optimal demand is:
Mρ=0 = −γ φ0 (ρ = 0)
φ1
+ (1 − γ )w [W0 + W1φ0 (ρ)]
p − w (W1φ1 − t) . (14)
The second order condition is satisfied. To show this, the second order condition after some
simplifications is:
∂
(
φ0 + φ1M
ρR + (1 − ρ)w [W0 + W1φ0 + (W1φ1 − t) M] − pM
) /
∂M
×{[(1 − ρ)w (W1φ1 − t) − p]
×
(
φ0 + φ1M
ρR + (1 − ρ)w [W0 + W1φ0 + (W1φ1 − t) M] − pM
)
− φ1
}
< 0. (15)
To save notation, I did not indicate above that the φ0 parameter depends on the retirement
status (ρ). For the retired this simplifies to:
(
R
p
+ φ0 (ρ = 1)
φ1
)
· pφ0 (ρ = 1) + φ1R
R − pM > 0, (16)
implying that themonetary cost ofmedical care should be smaller than the retirement income,
which is implied by the nonnegativity of consumption (C).
For the working population the second order condition is:
∂
(
φ0 + φ1M
w [W0 + W1φ0 + (W1φ1 − t) M] − pM
) /
∂M
×
{
[w (W1φ1 − t) − p]
(
φ0 + φ1M
w [W0 + W1φ0 + (W1φ1 − t) M] − pM
)
− φ1
}
< 0.
(17)
Using that
∂
(
φ0 + φ1M
w [W0 + W1φ0 + (W1φ1 − t) M] − pM
) /
∂M
= φ1wW0 + φ0 (wt + p)
(w [W0 + W1φ0 + (W1φ1 − t) M] − pM)2 > 0, (18)
the second order condition simplifies further to:
[w (W1φ1 − t) − p]
(
φ0 + φ1M
w [W0 + W1φ0 + (W1φ1 − t) M] − pM
)
− φ1 < 0, (19)
which can be rearranged to (and indicating that φ0 is a function of ρ):
wtφ0 (ρ = 1) + pφ0 (ρ = 1) + φ1wW0
w [W0 + W1(φ0 (ρ = 1) + φ1M) − tM] − pM > 0. (20)
This is again implied by the nonnegativity of consumption (C).
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